ABSTRACT Vehicles in a vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET) broadcast beacons giving safety-related and traffic information. In an open-access environment, this means that the VANET is susceptible to security and privacy issues. In this paper, we propose a new pseudo-identity-based scheme for conditional anonymity with integrity and authentication in a VANET. The proposed scheme uses a pseudonym in the joining process with the road-side unit (RSU) to protect the real identity even from the RSU, in case it is compromised. All previous identity-based schemes have been prone to insider attackers, and have not met the revocation process. Our scheme resolves these drawbacks as the vehicle signs the beacon with a signature obtained from the RSU. Our scheme satisfies the requirements for security and privacy, and especially the requirements for message integrity and authentication, privacy preservation, non-repudiation, traceability, and revocation. In addition, it provides conditional anonymity to guarantee the protection of an honest vehicle's real identity, unless malicious activities are detected. It is also resistant to common attacks such as modification, replay, impersonation, and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Although the numerous existing schemes have used a bilinear pairing operation, our scheme does not depend on this due to the complex operations involved, which cause significant computation overhead. Furthermore, it does not have a certification revocation list, giving rise to significant costs due to storage and inefficient communication. Our analysis demonstrates that our scheme can satisfy the security and privacy requirements of a VANET more effectively than previous schemes. We also compare our scheme with the recently proposed schemes in terms of communication and computation and demonstrate its cost-efficiency and appropriateness in working with the VANET. Meanwhile, the computation costs of the beacon signing and verification in our scheme are reduced by 49.9% and 33.3%, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
The principal aim of a VANET is to improve the safety of transportation. A UK Government Road Casualties Report of 2015 reveals that 1,732 persons have died and 22,137 were injured in road accidents [1] . Hence, VANET technology can help to decrease the number of accidents on the road. VANETs use IEEE 802.11p technology, via a protocol called Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC) [2] . A VANET environment is mainly composed of three components [3] : a trusted authority (TA), a road-side unit (RSU),
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and an on-board unit (OBU). The TA is responsible for initialising and providing system parameters, including public and private key pairs, to RSUs and vehicles. The RSU is located along the road as a router between vehicles and is considered to be part of the network infrastructure, while the OBU is a radio device installed in a vehicle and used to broadcast and receive beacons to other OBUs or RSU [4] . Using the DSRC protocol, vehicles can communicate with each other via vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication and with the RSU by vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication [5] .
Each OBU-equipped vehicle broadcasts safety-and traffic-related messages called beacons, containing its location, velocity, heading and traffic events, more than three times per second over a limited range of a few hundred meters [6] . Hence, each node (legal or illegal) located within this range receives these beacons, due to the nature of broadcasting in an open access environment. The security and privacy requirements in a VANET are therefore challenges that should be resolved before releasing it, both in order to avoid illegal and forged messages and to protect the privacy of drivers in terms of their identity and location. Illegal or forged messages may damage the VANET, and lead to road incidents and traffic jams.
Numerous academic studies have been conducted of the security and privacy requirements in VANETs. Although previous works have been able to meet most of these requirements for VANETs, they are not fully safe, and most also suffer from low performance in terms of computation and communication overhead and high storage. We therefore propose a robust scheme for conditional anonymity with integrity and authentication in VANET. The main contributions of our paper can be summarised as follows:
• We propose a new robust pseudo-identity-based scheme using a pseudonym rather than a real identity. The new scheme meets the security and privacy requirements of a VANET and is resistant to common attacks.
• The vehicle signs its beacons using a signature obtained from the RSU in order to meet the revocation requirement and to protect the vehicle's real identity from an insider attacker.
• The scheme supports a batch verification process to improve computational efficiency.
• The RSU only knows the vehicle's pseudonym, and is not able to acquire the vehicle's real identity.
• Our scheme provides conditional anonymity that guarantees protection of an honest vehicle's real identity, unless malicious activities are detected. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II describes some previous related works. Section III gives the preliminaries of the proposed scheme, and this is followed by a detailed description of our proposed scheme in Section IV. Sections V and VI present a security analysis and a performance analysis, respectively. Our paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
In recent years, many researchers have focused on the security and privacy issues of VANETs. We can class these works into two categories: public key infrastructure (PKI)-based and identity (ID)-based schemes.
In a PKI-based approach, the vehicle's real identity is hidden using anonymous certificates, and each vehicle obtains many certificates with their key pairs during the registration process. In 2004, Hubaux et al. [7] claimed that PKI technology could be suitable for handling security and privacy issues in VANETs. In 2007, Raya and Hubaux [8] used PKI and anonymous certificates to propose an anonymous authentication scheme that aimed to resolve the security and privacy issues in VANETs. The methodology of this scheme [8] requires preloading the vehicle with numerous certificates and the corresponding anonymous public/ private key pairs. In this case, OBUs suffer from a massive verification overhead and large storage requirements. Moreover, the TA generates a large certification revocation list (CRL), making the revocation processing ineffective. In 2008, Lu et al. [9] proposed a protocol for security in VANETs called ECPP to solve the increase in the CRL and the storage space limitations. In ECPP, the vehicle depends on the RSU to obtain a short-term pseudonym. In 2008, Zhang et al. [10] suggested a scheme known as efficient RSU-aided message authentication (RAISE), based on a k-anonymity approach and a hash message authentication code. In RAISE, messages are verified by the RSU to give low communication costs and to preserve the privacy of the vehicles. In 2016, Rajput et al. [11] suggested a protocol known as hierarchical privacy-preserving pseudonymous authentication to resolve these PKI-based drawbacks. This protocol does not require the management of a CRL, and the vehicle obtains only two pseudonyms with the corresponding key pairs. However, PKI-based schemes in VANETs encounter problems with the storage of certificates and key management.
To resolve the problems arising in PKI-based schemes, many researchers have proposed ID-based schemes for VANETs. The first work that used an ID-based signature was put forward in 1984 by Shamir [12] . In this scheme, the identity information is used as the node's public key, while private keys are generated by a TA using the same identity information and then distributed to nodes. The recipients verify the message using the sender's public key, and the message is signed using the sender's private key. Zhang et al. [13] , [14] used the vehicle user's identity in an ID-based scheme in which a vehicle does not need to save a large number of public and private keys and their certificates. This scheme therefore mitigates the amount of storage needed as well as the communication and computation costs. Additionally, it avoids the need for certificate management and a CRL. The schemes proposed by Zhang et al. [13] , [14] support batch verification based on bilinear pairing for the messages received by a vehicle and an RSU, and thus achieve low verification costs, allowing several messages to be verified concurrently. In 2009, Jiang et al. [15] used an ID-based scheme to propose the binary authentication tree (BAT) for V2I communication. BAT achieves high efficiency and meets the security and privacy requirements in VANETs. In 2011, Huang et al. [16] proposed a new authentication scheme termed PACP, which depends on using pseudonyms rather than real identities, providing conditional privacy and efficiency in performance. Chim et al. [17] and Lee and Lai [18] pointed out, in 2011 and 2013 respectively, that the schemes proposed in [13] , [14] have flaws that mean that an OBU can use a fake identity to eliminate the traceability requirement. In addition, these schemes cannot resist replay and impersonation attacks. VOLUME 7, 2019 In 2013, Lee and Lai [18] suggested an improved ID-based scheme to enhance security in VANETs and to achieve much higher effectiveness. In 2013, Horng et al. [19] demonstrated that the scheme in [17] was susceptible to impersonation attacks, and that a malicious vehicle was able to force another vehicle to broadcast bogus messages to other vehicles. Horng et al. [19] then proposed a scheme named SPECS to improve the flaws of the scheme [17] . In 2014, Jianhong et al. [20] highlighted several security drawbacks in the scheme proposed by Lee and Lai [18] , for example that it cannot meet the traceability and non-repudiation requirements and cannot resist replay attacks. To resolve the flaws in Lee and Lai's [18] scheme, an improved ID-based scheme was suggested by Jianhong et al. [20] . Recently, several researchers [21] - [28] have proposed ID-based authentication schemes that use elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) instead of bilinear pairing operations. These achieve high productivity in terms of computation and communication overhead.
Although existing ID-based authentication schemes have simplified key management, reduced the number of certificates and the storage overhead, and mitigated the computation and communication costs, they still suffer from certain challenges. We can categorise the previous ID-based schemes into three groups, each of which faces its own challenges that make it unsuitable for use in a VANET. Bilinear pairing operations are used in the first group [13] - [20] ; these schemes suffer from high computation and communication cost, and the same issues as those found in the second group [21] - [26] . In the second group, when a vehicle is broadcasting bogus information, a TA can track this vehicle but cannot stop it from continuing to send these messages. In addition, an insider attacker can easily reveal the real identity of any vehicle, since this attacker has the TA's private and public key pairs. Consequently, these schemes do not meet the requirements for revocation and privacy preservation. The schemes in the third group [27] , [28] depend on RSUs to verify beacons, and then publish lists of legal and illegal vehicles with the notification messages. The OBU will therefore wait for a notification message before verifying the legitimacy of the sender, and this process may be timeconsuming. Moreover, in the case where there are two nearby vehicles that are connected to different RSUs, in [27] , [28] , each RSU is responsible for verifying beacons and dealing only with the vehicles that are within its range and registered with it. Thus, these two vehicles cannot trust each other.
In this paper, we propose a new pseudo-ID-based scheme to address the aforementioned issues. Our scheme uses ECC instead of the bilinear pairing operations to resolve the communication and computation cost issue in [13] - [20] . Additionally, the vehicle signs the beacon by using a signature issued by the RSU, and this feature helps to overcome the flaws in [21] - [26] . Unlike the schemes in [27] , [28] , our scheme depends on each vehicle verifying the received beacons as well as providing mutual authentication between two vehicles within the ranges of different RSUs.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section first demonstrates the system model; this is followed by a description of the security and privacy requirements of a VANET and lastly, the mathematical tools used in this work are explained.
A. THE SYSTEM MODEL Our proposed scheme comprises three components, as shown in Fig. 1:   FIGURE 1 . The system model.
1)
A TA is a fully trusted party in a VANET and is accountable for initialising and providing the system parameters, including public and private key pairs, to RSUs and vehicles (we assume that a TA has complete knowledge of the location of all RSUs and connects with them via secure wire network). 2) RSUs are located along the road as routers between vehicles, and are considered part of the network infrastructure. An RSU manages the communication of all OBUs within its area and publishes traffic-related messages. It also connects to other RSUs to exchange traffic messages via secure wire network. Each RSU also has a unique real identity, RID R . 3) An OBU is a radio device installed in a vehicle that operates on the DSRC protocol to broadcast and receive beacons from other OBUs or RSUs. Each OBU has a tamper-proof device (TPD) that is accountable for storing secret parameters and implementing cryptographic operations.
B. SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS 1) MESSAGE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION
In a VANET, a recipient (vehicle or RSU) should have the ability to verify the receiving beacon and to ensure that the sender is legal. Moreover, the content of the beacon should be verified to ensure that it has been transported without being corrupted.
2) PRIVACY PRESERVATION
In a VANET, the scheme must meet the requirement of privacy preservation, which means that private information about vehicles such as their location and identity should be secure, and should not be revealed by the broadcast beacons.
3) TRACEABILITY AND REVOCATION
These are important requirements in a VANET, as they offer conditional anonymity. This means that a TA should have the ability to trace a malicious vehicle, to reveal its real identity and to prevent it from continuing to take part in VANET.
4) NON-REPUDIATION
This means that the senders of beacons should not be able to deny that they have sent beacons.
5) CONDITIONAL ANONYMITY
In a VANET, the scheme should offer conditional anonymity. This means guaranteeing the anonymity of an honest vehicle's real identity, unless malicious activities are detected.
6) RESISTANCE TO ATTACKS
In a VANET, an effective scheme should resist general attacks such as impersonation, replay, modification and MITM attacks.
C. MATHEMATICAL TOOLS
In 1985, Miller [29] proposed ECC, which has since become a widely used tool in the design of security algorithms and digital signatures. We assume that F p represents a finite field where p is a large prime number, E denotes an elliptic curve over F p that is based on the equation y 2 = x 3 + ax + b mod p, where 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p = 0 and x, y, a, b ∈ F p . Let O be an infinite point, and G an additive group with order q and generator P. An additive group G includes all points on the elliptic curve E. Let P and Q be two points on the elliptic curve E; the operation of point addition in G is then defined as P + Q = R. Scalar point multiplication in G is defined as s.P = P + P + .. .
. . + P(s times).
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) [30] is computationally infeasible. Based on E, and given two points P and Q from G, the main task of ECDLP is to find an integer s that satisfies Q = sP.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
Our proposed scheme has six phases: in the first and second phases, the system parameters are initialised and broadcast by the TA and the vehicle is registered. In the subsequent three phases, the vehicle will create a mutual authentication with the nearest RSU to start broadcasting and verifying operations, and at the same time will renew the signature if it expires, using any RSU for which the vehicle is in range. Fig. 2 illustrates an example to explain how the vehicle works during these three phases. In this example, the vehicle undergoes a five-stage process. In stage (A), the vehicle sends a 'joining request' message to the nearest RSU. In this state, the RSU needs to open a session with the TA to ensure the vehicle's legitimacy. In stage (B), when the vehicle has obtained agreement and a signature from the RSU, it starts broadcasting and verifying operations. When the signature expires, stage (C) renews it by sending a 'renew signature' message to the RSU. Then, in stage (D), the vehicle restarts broadcasting and verifying operations and will continue even within the range of another RSU. In stage (E), the vehicle can renew the signature, even using other RSUs, simply by sending a 'renew signature' message. Thus, the vehicle can start the broadcasting operation with a signature that can be relied on by others. Each signature has a set time period of validity, and once this expires, the vehicle needs to renew the signature. If a trusted vehicle begins broadcasting fake or bogus information in a VANET, the sixth phase of our proposed scheme allows us to trace this vehicle and revoke its permissions. Fig. 3 illustrates the operation of the proposed FIGURE 3. The operation of the proposed scheme. VOLUME 7, 2019 scheme, while Table 1 gives the main notations used and their descriptions. 
A. INITIALISATION PHASE
In this phase, the TA generates the initial system parameters using the following steps, and updates the system parameters to maintain the security of the system.
1) The TA selects two large prime numbers p, q and an additive group G with order q and generator P. An additive group G includes all points on the elliptic curve E that are defined by the equation
2) The TA generates a random number s ∈ Z * q as the private key, and computes the public key Pub = s.P.
3) The TA selects three secure hash functions
as a cryptographic hash function. 4) The TA preloads the private key s for each legal RSU. 5) The TA broadcasts the system parameters param = {q, Pub, P, h 1 , h 2 , h 3 }.
B. VEHICLE REGISTRATION PHASE
This phase happens when a new vehicle's user is willing to join the VANET, therefore, he/she should register for the TA. The procedure of this phase starts by submitting a real identityRID v and a password PW from the user to the TA via a secure channel. The TA checks the validity of the RID v and then computes the pseudonym Ps = h 3 (RID v s). Finally, it saves < RID R , PW , Ps > to the registration list and preloads Psto the vehicle's TPD.
C. VEHICLE JOINING PHASE
In this phase, the vehicle joins the RSU and creates a mutual authentication. To start the OBU, the driver of a vehicle should feedback TPD with RID v and PW to check the validity of the driver. If valid, the OBU starts the joining process as follows.
1) The OBU generates a random integer r∈Z * q and computes PID v1 = r.P and PID v2 = Ps h 1 (r.Pub). Then, the OBU sends {T 1 Otherwise, it checks the validity of the vehicle using the following equation:
If Equation (1) The 'renew signature' process can be carried out with any RSU. This means when a vehicle leaves the first RSU and needs to renew the signature, the new RSU does not need to connect to the TA to ensure the legitimacy of the vehicle, since the previous signature Sk was signed by the first RSU with the private key s.
E. BROADCASTING AND VERIFICATION PHASE 1) BROADCASTING
After the OBU joins the RSU, it starts broadcasting beacons using Sk as a signature for each beacon, as follows:
• The OBU computes the message signature σ m = Sk + r.h 3 (m T ).
• The OBU computes ω = h 3 (m T ) PID v1 , which is used to mitigate the verification time for the receptor.
• The OBU broadcasts the beacon {T , T Sk , PID v , m, ω, σ m }.
2) VERIFICATION
After the RSU or one OBU receives the beacon {T , T Sk , PID v , m, ω, σ m }, it first checks the validity of the timestamps {T , T Sk }. If so, it continues verifying the beacon by one of the following:
The recipient (the RSU or OBU) verifies the single beacon using the following equation:
If Equation (2) does not hold, the recipient rejects the beacon. Otherwise, the signature is valid, the sender is legal and the recipient accepts the beacon.
b: BATCH VERIFICATION
When the recipient (the RSU or OBU) receives a large number of beacons, the proposed scheme uses a batch verification method to mitigate the amount of time consumed. To meet the non-repudiation requirement, we use a technique called the small exponent test [19] , [20] . The recipient generates a vector of random integers x = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . x n }, where x i ∈ [1, 2 t ] and t is a small number, which does not increase the computational cost. Then, it verifies the beacons using the following equation:
If Equation (3) holds, all signatures are valid, all senders are legal and the recipient accepts all beacons. Otherwise, one or more vehicles are illegal. A new algorithm is proposed in [31] to identify these illegal vehicles. For more details, the reader is referred to [31] .
F. VEHICLE REVOCATION PHASE
This phase is very important in a VANET to allow the TA not only to trace a malicious authenticated vehicle and reveal its identity, but also to prevent this vehicle from taking further part in a VANET. This phase is as follows.
1) If a malicious authenticated vehicle is broadcasting bogus beacons, the RSU computes its pseudonym according to PID v , where Ps
2) The RSU sends Ps to the TA.
3) The TA reveals the real identity of the culprit vehicle, according to Ps in the registration list, and then deletes it from the registration list and sends an {acknowledgement message} to the RSU. 4) After receiving the {acknowledgement message} from the TA, the RSU prevents this vehicle from renewing the signature and adds all its information to a temporary list. At the same time, it sends this list to the nearby RSUs to prevent the vehicle from renewing the signature with other RSUs, in case the vehicle moves out of range of the current RSU. When T SK expires, the OBU cannot renew the signature. However, a revoked OBU may have the ability to broadcast beacons until T Sk expires.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
This section presents a security analysis of our proposed scheme, in order to demonstrate that our scheme is strongly secured under a random oracle model and to ensure that it meets the security and privacy requirements mentioned in Section III-B. We also present a comparison of our scheme with existing methods.
A. SECURITY PROOF 
Thus, it is verified that Equation (1) is accurate. Proof of Equation (2): In single verification, the recipient verifies the beacon using Equation (2).
L.H .S.σ m P
= (Sk + r.h 3 (m T )) .P = (s.h 2 (PID v1 PID v2 T Sk ) + r.h 3 (m T )) .P = h 2 (PID v1 PID v2 T Sk ) .s.P + h 3 (m T ) .r.P = h 2 (PID v1 PID v2 T Sk ) .Pub + h 3 (m T ) .PID v1 = h 2 (PID v1 PID v2 T Sk ) .Pub + ω = R.H .S.
Thus, Equation (2) is verified as accurate.
Proof of Equation (3): In batch verification, the recipient verifies the beacons using Equation (3).
L.H .S
Thus, Equation (3) is verified as accurate.
To analyse the security proof in the proposed scheme, we construct a game between a challenger Ch and an adversary Ad based on the network model of a VANET and an adversary.
Theorem 2: Our proposed scheme is unforgeable against an adaptively chosen message attack under the random oracle model.
Proof: We assume that Ad can forge a legitimate signature {T , T Sk , PID v , m, ω, σ m } for the message m, and that a ECDLP instance (P, Q = sP) is given for two points P, Q on E/E p and s ∈ Z * q . Then, by running Ad as a subroutine, the challenger Ch can solve the ECDLP with non-negligible probability.
Setup: Challenger Ch sets Pub = Q = sP as a public key and produces public parameters param = {q, Pub, P, h 1 
Output: Finally, Ad outputs a beacon {T , T Sk , PID v , m, ω, σ m }. Ch verifies this beacon using the following equation:
where ω = h i, 3 PID v1 If this equation does not hold, Ch terminates the game. According to the forgery lemma in [18] , Ad can output another valid beacon {T , T Sk , PID v , m, ω, σ * m } that satisfies the following equation:
where ω = h i,3 PID v1 Based on Equations (5) and (6), we can deduce
Then, we can obtain
as a solution to the given ECDLP instance. However, this contradicts the hardness of ECDLP. Thus, our proposed scheme under the random oracle model is resistant against a chosen adaptive message.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) MESSAGE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION
Consistent with Theorem 2, the ECDLP is hard. Thus, the adversary cannot forge a valid beacon in our proposed scheme, and recipients can examine the integrity and validity of the beacon {T , T Sk , PID v , m, ω, σ m } by checking whether the equation σ m P = h 2 (PID v1 PID v2 T Sk ) Pub+ω holds. Hence, our proposed scheme satisfies the message integrity and authentication requirement.
2) PRIVACY PRESERVATION
In our scheme, the vehicle obtains the pseudonym Ps during the registration process from the TA, which is the only element that knows the real identity RID v of the vehicle, where Ps = h 3 (RID v s). The vehicle uses Ps to generate the PID v that is included with the beacons, where PID v1 = r.P, PID v2 = Ps h 1 (r.Pub), and r ∈ Z * q is a random integer number. Hence, the adversary cannot acquire the real identity even if the RSU is compromised. In our scheme, the vehicle also renews the signature and updates PID v after the T Sk expires, meaning that after a short time, an adversary receives a beacon message containing a different PID v and signed with a new Sk. It is therefore very difficult for an adversary to generate a correlation between the fast-changing pseudonyms for the vehicle, and the adversary cannot acquire the location of the vehicle. Thus, our proposed scheme satisfies the requirement for privacy preservation.
3) TRACEABILITY AND REVOCATION
In the proposed scheme, although a beacon does not contain any information about RID v , the TA can trace and revoke the bogus vehicle, as mentioned in Section IV-F. Thus, our proposed scheme satisfies the traceability and revocation requirements.
4) NON-REPUDIATION
In our scheme, once the TA has traced the RID v of a beacon sent to the VANET, the beacon sender will not be able to deny he/she sent this beacon since the OBUs broadcast dissimilar beacons based on their own unique Ps. In addition, in the process of batch verification of beacons, we use a random integer vector x = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . x n } to exam any exchanges of the beacons. Thus, our proposed scheme satisfies the non-repudiation requirement.
5) CONDITIONAL ANONYMITY
The real identity of the offender vehicle in our scheme is traced and revoked from the VANET when malicious activity is detected, as mentioned in Section IV-F. However, the anonymity of honest vehicles is guaranteed in the scheme. Thus, our proposed scheme satisfies the conditional anonymity requirement.
6) RESISTANCE TO IMPERSONATION ATTACK
• In the case where an attacker attempts to impersonate the vehicle in the joining phase: In the proposed scheme, the joining message {T 1 , PID v , σ OBU } that is sent by the vehicle to the RSU contains σ OBU = h 3 (T 1 Ps). Therefore, an attacker cannot impersonate any vehicle because he/she does not have the vehicle's pseudonym Ps.
• In the case where an attacker attempts to impersonate the vehicle while renewing the signature: T 1 ). Hence, an attacker must have the old Sk and the random number r to be able to impersonate the vehicle that wants to renew the signature.
• In the case where an attacker attempts to impersonate the vehicle while broadcasting beacons:
In the proposed scheme, the beacon message {T , T Sk , PID v , m, ω, σ m }, has the signature σ m , signed with Sk and the random number r. Therefore, the attacker must acquire r and Sk to impersonate the vehicle. This is difficult, because r is a random number generated by the vehicle and Sk is a signature that has a limited period of validity and is generated by the RSU for the vehicle. Thus, an impersonation attack is ineffective in our scheme.
7) RESISTANCE TO A REPLAY ATTACK
In the beacon message {T , T Sk , PID v , m, ω, σ m }, we use the current timestamp T . An attacker cannot modify T in a beacon since in the verification process, the beacon would be rejected if T was invalid or had expired. Thus, the replay attack is ineffective in the proposed scheme. In this scheme, the beacon contains the signature σ m , which ensures the safety of the message from modification. If an attacker modifies the beacon, it would be rejected in the signature verification process. Thus, the modification attack is ineffective in the proposed scheme.
9) RESISTANCE TO A MITM ATTACK
In our scheme, mutual authentication is carried out between the sender and the verifier. If an adversary attempts an MITM attack, he/she needs to forge beacons to connect with the sender and the verifier. However, according to Theorem 2, it is impossible for an adversary to issue this type of attack. Thus, the MITM attack is ineffective in our scheme.
C. COMPARISION WITH EXISTING SCHEMES
This subsection presents a comparison of our scheme with prior approaches regarding issues found in groups [13] - [20] , [21] - [26] , and [27] , [28] . The proposed scheme does not depend on a bilinear pairing operation and satisfies the requirements for revocation and privacy. It also does not depend on the RSU to verify beacons. Table 2 presents the results of comparison. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section explains the computation and communication costs.
A. COMPUTATION COST
In this subsection, we demonstrate the performance of our scheme by comparing it with those of Jianhong et al. [20] , Debiao et al. [22] , Libing et al. [25] , and Jie et al. [27] in terms of computation cost. The cryptography operation in [20] is built on bilinear pairings, while those of [22] , [25] , [27] and our scheme use ECC. In a bilinear pairing with an 80-bit security level, the additive groupḠ is generated based on an elliptic curveĒ :y 2 = x 3 + x modp, wherep is a 512-bit prime number. However, in ECC with the same security level, the additive group G is generated based on an elliptic curve E : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b mod p, where p is a 160-bit prime number. The execution times for the cryptographic operations used in [22] are adopted in this paper, as shown in Table 3 (where Abbr. means the abbreviations of cryptographic operations). Since the execution time of the concatenate and XOR operations is much lower than the execution time for a hash function, these are considered negligible and are excluded from the analysis of computation cost. For simplicity, let BGS, SVOB and BVMB denote the generation and signing of the beacon, the single verification for a beacon, and the batch verification for multiple beacons, respectively. In the scheme of Jianhong et al. [20] , BGS comprises the following operations: six scalar multiplications; two point additions; one map-to-point hash function; and four secure hash functions. Hence, the total computation time of BGS is 6T sm−bp + 2T pa−bp + 1T mtp + 4T h ≈ 14.6746. SVOB for this scheme involves the following operations: three bilinear pairings; two scalar multiplications; one point addition; and three secure hash function. Thus, the overall computation time of SVOB is 3T bp + 2T sm−bp + 1T pa−bp + 3T h ≈ 16.0584. BVMB for this scheme involves the following operations: three bilinear pairings; (n+1) scalar multiplications; (2n) small scalar point multiplications; (3n−2) point additions; and (3n) secure hash functions. This means that the total computation time of the BVMB is 3T bp + (n + 1) T sm−bp + (2n) T sm−bp−s + (3n − 2) T pa−bp + (3n) T h ≈ 1.8376n + 14.3267.
In the scheme of Debiao et al. [22] , BGS comprises three scalar multiplications and three secure hash functions. Hence, the total computation time of BGS is 3T sm−e + 3T h ≈ 1.3263. SVOB in this scheme involves three scalar multiplications, two secure hash functions and two point additions, giving an overall computation time for SVOB of 3T sm−ecc + 2T h + 2T pa−ecc ≈ 1.3298. BVMB in this scheme requires (n + 2) scalar multiplications; (2n) small scalar point multiplications; (2n−1) point additions; and (2n) secure hash functions. The overall computation time for BVMB is there-
In the scheme of Libing et al. [25] , BGS comprises two scalar multiplications and two secure hash functions, giving an overall computation time for BGS of 2T sm−ecc + 2T h ≈ 0.8841.SVOB for this scheme is comprises four scalar multiplications, two secure hash functions, and two point additions. Hence, the overall computation time for SVOB is 4T sm−ecc + 2T h + 2T pa−ecc ≈ 1.7718. BVMB involves the following operations: (2n + 2) scalar multiplications; (2n) small scalar point multiplications; (2n + 2) point additions; and (2n) secure hash functions, giving an overall computation time for BVMB of (n + 2)
In the scheme of Jie et al. [27] , BGS comprises two scalar multiplications and two secure hash functions, giving an overall computation time for the BGS of 2T sm−ecc +2T h ≈ 0.8841. SVOB and BVMB for this scheme are achieved using the RSU, and involve four steps, as follows:
• In the first step, the RSU verifies the public keys with the shared secrets. This requires one scalar multiplication and one secure hash function for each beacon.
• In the second step, the RSU checks the validity of beacons. Here, SVOB comprises two scalar multiplications, one secure hash function, and one point addition. BVMB involves two scalar multiplications, (2n) small scalar point multiplications, (n+1) point additions, and (n) secure hash functions.
• In the third step, the RSU fills the cuckoo filter with the valid and invalid signatures to generate the notification message. Here, the RSU carries out only three secure hash functions for each beacon.
• In the last step, when a vehicle receives the notification message and beacons, it uses three secure hash functions to verify whether the beacon's signature appears in the positive or negative list. Hence, the total computation times of SVOB and BVMB in the scheme of Jie et al. [27] are 3T sm−e + 7T h 1T pa−ecc ≈ 1.3285 and (n+2)2T sm−ecc +(2n) T sm−ecc−s + (n1) T pa−ecc +(7n)T h ≈ 0.4721n+0.8838, respectively.
In our proposed scheme, BGS involves one scalar multiplication and two secure hash functions. Thus, the total computation time of BGS is 1T sm−ecc + 2T h ≈ 0.4422. SVOB involves two scalar multiplications, one secure hash function, and one point addition, giving an overall computation time for the SVOB of 2T sm−ecc + 1T h + 1T pa−ecc ≈ 0.8859. BVMB involves two scalar multiplications, (2n) small scalar point multiplications, (n + 1) point additions and (n) secure hash functions, giving a total computation time for BVMB of (n + 2) T sm−ecc + (2n) T sm−ecc−s + (2n − 1) T pa−ecc + (2n) T h ≈ 0.0295n + 0.9153. Table 4 presents a comparison of the computation cost of the proposed scheme with other four ID-based schemes in terms of BGS, SVOB and BVMB. As shown in Table 4 , the computation time for BGS in the proposed scheme is 0.4422 ms, which is 96.9%, 66.7%, 49.9% and 49.9% lower than the schemes of Jianhong et al. [20] , Debiao et al. [22] , Libing et al. [25] , and Jie et al. [27] , respectively. The computation time for SVOB in our scheme is 0.8859 ms, i.e. 94.5%, 33.4%, 50% and 33.3% lower than in the above schemes, while the computation time for BVMB in our scheme for 50 beacons is 2.3903 ms, which is 97.8%, 90.3%, 94.9% and 90.2% lower than in the above schemes. Table 5 shows the improvement of our proposed scheme over the other schemes in terms of computation cost. Fig. 4 demonstrates that our scheme has a large advantage over the other four schemes with respect to BGS and SVOB. Fig. 5 shows the computation costs for BVMB for different numbers of beacons. Consequently, the proposed scheme is more efficient and effective than those of Jianhong et al. [20] , Debiao et al. [22] , Libing et al. [25] , and Jie et al. [27] in terms of the computation cost for BGS, SVOB and BVMB. 
B. COMMUNICATION COST
We now compare our scheme with those of Jianhong et al. [20] , Debiao et al. [22] , Libing et al. [25] , and Jie et al. [27] in terms of communication cost. As mentioned in the previous subsection, the size of p is 64 bytes, meaning that the size of each element in G is 128 bytes, and the size of p is 20 bytes, meaning that the size of each element in G is 40 bytes. We also assume that the output sizes of the timestamp, secure hash function and element in integer group Z * q are 4, 20 and 20 bytes, respectively. The comparative results of our scheme with prior schemes are listed in Table 6 , where the content of the message is excluded. As shown in Table 6 , the size of the beacon in the scheme of Jianhong et al. [20] is (128 × 3 + 4) = 388 bytes, and the content of the beacon is three elements inḠ {ID 1 , ID 2 , σ ∈Ḡ} and one timestamp. The beacon size in the scheme of Debiao et al. [22] is (40 × 3 + 20 + 4) = 144 bytes, and the content of beacon is three elements in G {AID 1 i , AID 2 i , R i ∈ G}, one element σ i ∈ Z q , and one timestamp. The beacon size in the scheme of Libing et al. [25] is (40 × 3 + 20 + 8) = 148 bytes and the content of the beacon is three elements in {PID vi , h ki , R i ∈ G}, one hash function δ i ∈ Z q , and two timestamps. The beacon size in the scheme of Jie et al. [27] is (40 + 20 × 2 + 4) = 84 bytes, and the content of beacon is one element in ID i1 ∈ G, two elements in {Z q ID i2 , σ i ∈ Z q , and one timestamp. In our proposed scheme, the vehicle broadcasts a beacon with size (40 + 20 × 3 + 8) = 108 bytes and the content of beacon is one element in {PID v1 ∈ G}, three elements in {Z q PID v2 , σ m , ω ∈ Z q }, and two timestamps. Table 6 shows that the overall communication overhead of our proposed scheme is relatively low. Here, the communication overhead in the scheme of Jie et al. [27] is slightly lower than ours, since the proposed scheme mitigates the computation cost for the recipient, where the sender of the beacon calculates part of Equations (2) and (3) by implement ω = h (m T ) PID v1 , and inserts ω into the beacon.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new pseudo-ID-based scheme for a VANET with conditional anonymity, message authentication and integrity. The proposed scheme depends on using a pseudonym instead of the real identity, and satisfies all the security and privacy requirements of a VANET as well as resisting common attacks. Our scheme can provide conditional anonymity in which only the real identity of a vehicle conducting malicious activity is revealed. We were able to overcome the previous drawbacks of ID-based schemes, and our scheme does not require the complex operations that are produced by a bilinear pairing operation. It can also preserve privacy in terms of the vehicle's real identity, even from an insider attacker. Furthermore, the TA can trace a bogus vehicle and revoke it as a member of the VANET. A security analysis shows that our scheme is secure under the random oracle module and can meet the security and privacy requirements of a VANET. We compare our scheme with recent proposed ID-based schemes and show that it has computation costs that are lower than previous schemes and lightweight communication. Our scheme resolves these challenges positively and is suitable for VANETs.
